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"cohabitate" in or outside the home with any single or married man.
Nor will it allow a state statute to prevail if it precludes payments to
the child simply because a man is living with the spouse. In this type
of situation, there has to be actual proof of contribution. If such proof
cannot be found, then a denial would deprive the recipient of his rights
to receive aid. Welfare applicants are entitled to receive payments if
they meet the requirements set out in the Social Security Act. The state
cannot restrict the child nor the parent of this right by imposing one-
year waiting or resident requirements, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
and Wyman v. Bowens, supra. Generally, discrimination is not upheld by
the Supreme Court when a similar act to that of the above is alleged.
The United States Supreme Court in Damico v. Californa, supra, said
that it would also be discriminating if the court denied a welfare recipient
relief because he did not seek relief first under the state law. Recently,
there have been a few cases decided in the United States Supreme Court
regarding termination of welfare recipients' benefits. The majority of
the cases decided seem to hold that before terminating any recipients there
must be an evidentiary hearing before welfare authorities and that wel-
fare officials should not terminate recipients if they refuse entry into
their homes without a search warrant. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, and
Wyman v. James, supra.
JOSEPH L. ASKEW
Civil Arrest in North Carolina
At common law, one's creditor had an absolute right to have him
arrested and imprisoned until his debt was paid.' Upon his arrest before
judgment, the debtor could give bail as an assurance of his appearance in
court. A failure to do so resulted in his confinement in jail until judgment
was rendered, and if he then failed to pay the debt, he was subject to body
execution-a fate which caused the debtor to be thrown in jail until the
debt was paid. More often than not the penniless debtor remained there
until his death as the creditor rarely intervened since a release of the judg-
ment constituted a satisfaction of the judgment.2
In order to be rid of these harsh debtor laws, English immigrants
crossed the Atlantic and underwent other innumerable hardships. As a
14 Am. Jur., Arrest § 52 (1936).
' -, Arrest and Imprisonment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 172 (1951).
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result, today more than four-fifths of the state constitutions provide in
some way that there will be no imprisonment for debt. Many of these have
done so without restrictions; others abolished imprisonment in certain
cases only.
8
The most frequent exception of the prohibition against imprisonment
for debt appearing in the constitutions omits cases where fraud is in-
volved. Approximately one-half of the state constitutions specifically
exempt such cases. Nevertheless if one relied only on an examination of
state constitutions, he would be led to believe that for the most part, all
remnants of the institution for debtor prisons have passed on with time;
however, this is far from the truth. The old common law practice has been
refined and is less often used, but is alive and with us in many states,
including North Carolina.
NORTH CAROLINA DEBTOR IMPRISONMENT LAWS
The North Carolina Constitution provides:
There shall be no imprisonment for debt in this State except in
cases of fraud.4
But this section of the Constitution has undergone such erosion through
legislative enactment and judicial interpretation that along its side has
grown an illegitimate child of the common law debtor prison system.
Statutory procedures for arrest and bail, and body execution in many
North Carolina cases afford a creditor the same privileges that he could
exercise at common law. The provisional remedies of arrest and bail are
provided for in North Carolina General Statutes sections 1-409 through
1-439. The cases in which a defendant may be arrested are specifically set
out in sec. 1-410.
In what cases arrest allowed. ...
(1) . . . action not arising out of contract . . . wilful, wanton, or
malicious injury to person or character . . . wilfully, wantonly,
or maliciously injuring, taking, detaining, or converting real or
personal property.
(2) ... action for a fine or penalty, for seduction, for money received,
for property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied by . . . person
in fiduciary capacity.
(3) . . . action to recover . . . personal property, unjustly detained,
8 Carr v. The State, 106 Ala. 37 (1894).
'N.C. Const. Art. 4 § 28.
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where . . . property has been concealed, removed, or disposed of
... with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit thereof.
(4) . . . fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation ....
in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking. .. when
the action is brought to recover damages for fraud and deceit.
(5) . . . defendant has removed, or disposed of his property . . . to
defraud creditors . . .5
A cursory inspection of the statute would lead one to believe that it
is inconsistent and repugnant to the constitutional prohibition against im-
prisonment for debt. However Moore v. Green6 settled this question
with the decision that the constitutional prohibition against debt does not
apply to causes of action involving torts, as the framers meant to restrict
the clause to cases arising in contract. Therefore, though a judgment ob-
tained in a tort case might generally be considered as a debt, it is not so
considered in regard to the constitutional prohibition against debt.
Today in North Carolina a person may be arrested and held to bail
in contract cases involving fraud,7 in tort cases' where there is a wilful
injury to person,9 property,'0 or character," and in fiduciary cases where
there is a breach of trust.1 2 Now, as at common law, if a judgment is
rendered against him for one of the causes set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-410,
the provisions of sec. 1-311 authorize an execution against the judgment
debtor's person, after a return of the execution against his property wholly
or partially unsatisfied.' The judgment debtor then is entitled to discharge
without payment, only by surrendering all of his property in excess of fifty
dollars. Such action amounts to a deprivation of his homestead exemption
and of any personal property exemption over fifty dollars.'
With the slightest imagination, a vengeful creditor can have his debtor,
even in contract cases, subjected to the hardships and inconvenience per-
mitted by statute. In order to secure the provisional rights of arrest and
bail, it is only necessary that a creditor obtain an order of arrest from the
court, by his submission of an affidavit setting forth the existence of, or
5 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-400 (1969).
'Moore v. Green, 73 N.C. 398 (1875).
" McNeely v. Haynes, 76 N.C. 122 (1877).
'Long v. McLean, 88 N.C. 3 (1883).
'Bridgers v. Taylor, 102 N.C. 86 (1889).
'0 Oakley v. Lasoter, 172 N.C. 96 (1916).
1 Michael v. Leach, 166 N.C. 223 (1914).
12 Powers v. Davenport, 101 N.C. 292 (1888).
18 Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 37 (1963).
"' Raisin Fertilizer Co. v. Grubbs, 114 N.C. 473 (1894).
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grounds for his belief that, a cause of action exists under G.S. 1-410.'5
The Court will then decide whether an order will be issued."6 Before the
order is given though, the creditor must put up a bond of at least one
hundred dollars as a surety for paying damages to the defendant, should
the latter prevail.' 7 After judgment a creditor may obtain body execution
against the judgment debtor by showing a lawful arrest under G.S. 1-410,
or by alleging facts in his complaint or affidavit" that would justify such
an arrest.
In defense of the creditor's statutory rights, the accused may at any
time before judgment apply on motion to vacate the order of arrest or
to reduce the amount of bail. He also has the right to demand the issue
raised by the creditor's affidavit be submitted to a jury.' 9
CASE AGAINST CIVIL ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT
Civil arrest and imprisonment as it exists in North Carolina is an
anachronism inconsistent with modem jurisprudence.2" At the beginning
of this century, Justice Hughes wrote:
Statutes permitting arrest and imprisonment in civil cases, except
cases of contempt of court, are a constant menace to the innocent,
they are the occasion for wrongs even more serious because committed
under the guise of legal process, than those they were designed to
prevent and to punish.21
The argument may be put forth that there are several safeguards in
the civil arrest statutes designed to protect the debtor. The first, that
the order of arrest will be issued only by a judge or the court. However,
judicial discretion is at best an uncertain safeguard when viewed in the
context of the procedural means available to a creditor seeking personal
vengeance.22 Then it could be argued that the debtor may move to vacate
the order for his arrest or to reduce the amount of his bail. But, justice
can never be done by placing a man where he is forced to take the
initiative in a fight for justice and his freedom. Such a burden is not
placed upon offenders against the public law.2
5 Harris v. Sneedey, 101 N.C. 278 (1888).
1 Id.
'7 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-412 (1969).
Nunn v. Smith, 270 N.C. 378 (1967).
'8N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-417 (1969).88 See note 2, supra.
21 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-412.
'* See note 2, supra at 180.
8 Finley, J.C., Arrest of Defendant in Civil Action, 20 Ky. L.J. 479 (1931-32).
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In civil arrest and imprisonment, the state deprives a debtor of his
liberty through the process of its courts executed by its law enforcement
officers, even though the action is set in motion by a private creditor.
2 4
Yet the anomaly exists of imposing a criminal consequence upon a civil
judgment based on a trial of the issues wherein the charges need be proved
merely by a preponderance of the evidence, and not, as in other cases
where criminal consequences follow beyond a reasonable doubt.2 5 Justice
Traynor recognized this in a recent case in which he held that a defendant
arrested under civil process is entitled under due process to have the
statutes insure that he be told of his rights under the statutory codes as
is necessary when a criminal arrest takes place.2 6
The principle of enforcing criminal process in civil actions upon a
debtor where none of the safeguards attendant upon that process are avail-
able to him is inconsistent with present day concepts of punishment. If
the punishment set out in the civil arrest statutes is desirable, then it
should be provided for by amending the criminal statutes. 7
Adequate reform of North Carolina civil arrest statutes would require
that their statutory purpose be confined to the original historical concept
of providing an auxiliary remedy designed to keep the debtor within the
reach of the court's final process. 8 A number of states have made such
a change as Ind. Stat. sec. 3-302 through 3-953 shows:
.. . Plaintiff's right to recover an existing debt from defendant,
and stating that he believes the defendant is about to leave the state,
taking with him property subject to execution or money or effect which
should be applied to the payment of the plaintiff's damages, with intent
to defraud the plaintiff.29
Even where statutes have limitations such as the Indiana statutes,
provisions need to be made for the prevention of abuse by a vengeful credi-
tor. The North Carolina provision that a minimum bond of one hundred
dollars be put up by the plaintiff is wholly inadequate for this purpose.
A more realistic deterrent against abuse would be an allowance of treble
damages to the defendant in the event that he recovers with a requirement
that before the order of arrest is granted, the plaintiff provide a bond of
"In re Harris, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968).
" Parnass, Imprisonment for Civil Obligations, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 571, 572 (1920-
21).
26 In re Harris, supra at note 24.
, See note 2 supra at 180.2'6 CJS Arrest §.23 (1937).
9 Ind. Stat. § 3-302/953 (1968).
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three times the amount he seeks as a recovery. Such safeguards appear
no more than reasonable when considered in the context that a plaintiff
may call on the penal machinery of the state in order to insure the satis-
faction of a civil judgment.
CONCLUSION
A -similar process to the common law debtor prison system exists in
many states today, including North Carolina, despite a provision in many
state constitutions that there will be no imprisonment for debt. Today in
North Carolina statutory provisions for arrest and bail and body execution
allow civil arrest and imprisonment where a judgment is returned wholly
or partly dissatisfied in contract cases involving fraud, in cases of in-
tentional or wilful torts, and in fiduciary cases where there is a breach
of trust.
The statutory remedies may be secured by a creditor through the
filing with the court a complaint or an affidavit alleging a statutory right
to have a defendant civilly arrested or alleging the grounds for a belief
that such right exists, along with the necessary bond set by the court.
If the court issues the order, a defendant has the right to move that it
be vacated, that the bail be reduced and that the issues be submitted to a
jury.
Civil arrest and imprisonment statutes are penal in nature without
criminal safeguards, structured for vengeance by a creditor, and represent
an anachronism inconsistent with modern jurisprudence. An adequate
reform of North Carolina statutes would require that they be restricted
to cases in which the debtor is fraudulently attempting to abscond from
the jurisdiction and that they permit a greater recovery of damages by
the defendant in order to deter would-be vengeful plaintiffs.
ERNEST B. FULLWOOD
LEGAL KIDNAPPING: A look at recent decisions involving the validity
of criminal commitments to state hospitals
In a recent Pennsylvania case, Dixon v. Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 313 F. Supp. 653 (1970), the pro-
ceeding was a class suit brought by seven plaintiffs, individually and on
behalf of all inhabitants of Farview State Hospital situated like unto
them. The complaint alleges the unconstitutionality of the confinement
6
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